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PROTECTING LIFE AND LIBERTY:
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY AND NECESSITY OF
CIVIL COMMITMENT OF SEXUAL PREDATORS
INTRODUCTION
Before the revival of "sexual psychopath" laws less than a decade
ago, the State of Washington was forced to release Earl Shriner from
prison.' Shriner's criminal tirade spanned more than two decades. 2
At the age of sixteen, he killed a schoolmate.3 He was later released
from a mental institution, only to kidnap and rape two teenage girls.4
While incarcerated for those acts, Shriner told an inmate of his desire
to own a van with cages in order to molest, torture, and murder chil-
dren. 5 Anxiously awaiting his release from prison, Shriner kept a di-
ary detailing his criminal plans of torture and murder.6
Shriner was not eligible for civil commitment under Washington's
general civil commitment law, which required mental illness and a re-
cent overt act. 7 So, after serving a ten-year sentence, the state re-
leased Shriner, freeing him to commit his most brutal crime yet.8 He
kidnapped, raped, strangled, and then sexually mutilated a seven-
year-old boy who was riding his bike around the neighborhood.9
Shortly after the citizens of Washington were shocked by this un-
thinkable crime, the government acted to ensure this type of brutality
never happened to one of its children again.'l Washington enacted
the first modern law providing for the involuntary civil commitment of
sexual predators.I Several state legislatures have followed suit, moti-
vated largely by the public's concern for the protection of innocent
children. ' 2
1. Barry Siegel. Locking Up Sexual Predators. L.A. TIMES. May 10. 1990. at Al.
2. Deborah L. Morris. Constitutional Implications ofthe Involuntary Commitment of Sexually
Violent Predators: A Due Process Analysis. 82 CORNI[LL L. REV. 594, 611 (1997).
3. Id.
4. Id.





10. See Seling v. Young. 531 U.S. 250. 254 (2001).
11. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 71.09.010 - 79.09.902 (1992 & Supp. 2003).
12. See Seling. 531 U.S. at 254 (noting that the Washington State Community Protection Act
was enacted in response to citizens' concerns about laws dealing with sexually violent offenders).
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Several scholars have sharply criticized these laws as unconstitu-
tional. 13 In fact, the majority of commentary available on the subject
asserts that these laws are fundamentally opposed to the American
notion of rights to "life and liberty."' 4 This Comment argues that the
contrary is true: these laws protect and defend the rights of society to
life and liberty. These laws, though imperfect, are a necessary step
toward preventing brutal sexual crimes from being repeated by indi-
viduals who escape the system. 15
Part II of this Comment begins by describing the problem of sexual
violence in America.16 Part II also examines the solution of civil com-
mitment posed by many states in response to this group of predators 17
and provides the United States Supreme Court's position on the con-
stitutionality of these sexual predator laws.' 8  This section also in-
cludes a discussion of the Kansas Supreme Court's and United States
Supreme Court's decisions in a recent sexual predator case, In re
Crane. Part III offers an analysis of judicial decisions in this area of
law and addresses common arguments opposing civil commitment.' 9
Finally, Part IV explores the impact of the United States Supreme
Court's recent decisions on the future of civil commitment of sexually
violent predators. 20
II. BACKGROUND
In order to understand why special laws are needed to address the
problem of sexually violent predators, some explanation is required.
This section will briefly discuss the problem of sexual violence in
13. See Dawn J. Post, Preventative Victimization: Assessing Future Dangerousness in Sexual
Predators for Purposes of Indeterminate Civil Commitment, 21 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POLY 177,
180 (1999).
14. Id. at 180 (noting that over 150 articles have been published opposing this type of commit-
ment legislation). For opposing arguments., see generally Kimberly A. Dorsett, Kansas v. Hen-
dricks: Marking the Beginning of a Dangerous New Era in Civil Commitment. 48 DEPAUL L.
REv. 113 (1998): Grant H. Morris. The Evil That Men Do: Perverting Justice to Punish Perverts,
2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1199; Eric S. Janus. Foreshadowing the Future of Kansas v. Hendricks:
Lessons From Minnesota's Sex Offender Commitment Litigation, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 1279 (1998);
Madelyn J. Daley, Comment, Do Sexually Violent Predators Deserve Constitutional Protections?,
23 S. ILL. U. L.J. 715 (1999); Cynthia A. King, Fighting the Devil We Don't Know: Kansas v.
Hendricks. A Case Study Exploring the Civilization of Criminal Punishment and Its Ineffective-
ness in Preventing Child Abuse, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1427 (1999).
15. See Katie Isaac, Kansas v. Hendricks: A Perilous Step Forward in the Fight Against Child
Molestation. 35 Hous. L. REV. 1295. 1330 (1998).
16. See infra notes 21-34 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 35-53 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 54-180 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 181-251 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 252-265 and accompanying text.
1246 (Vol. 52:1245
PROTECTING LIFE AND LIBERTY
America and will examine the sexually violent predator laws in detail.
Supreme Court decisions on the subject will also be discussed in order
to provide a background upon which to proceed with the legal discus-
sion of these laws.
A. The Problem of Sexual Violence in America
The problem of sexual violence in our society has grown to alarm-
ing numbers. In 1995 alone, almost 355,000 rapes and sexual assaults
were reported in America. 21 Surprisingly, this number only includes
those reports by victims over the age of twelve 22 and is estimated to be
significantly smaller than the number of actual assaults, given the vast
underreporting unique to sexual crimes.2 3 In 1994, nearly 100,000 in-
mates were incarcerated for rape or sexual assault, almost half of
them for victimizing children. 24 In addition, 134,000 other sex offend-
ers were either on probation or parole that year.25 From 1980 to 1994,
sex offenders was the fastest-growing category of violent criminal. 26
Aside from the severity of the problem, sex offenders as a group
pose particular problems for the traditional criminal justice system.27
For example, although imprisoning sex offenders may satisfy the retri-
bution goal of incarceration, the goal of deterrence is often not
achieved by time served in prison.28 This is because many sex offend-
ers are affected by a mental abnormality or illness, which inhibits their
self-control and thus makes deterrence unlikely.29
Upon re-entering society after incarceration, sex offenders are
much more likely to repeat a sexual crime than any other type of felon
21. U.S. DEP'T OF JusTiICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SEX OFFENSES AND OFFENDERS
109 (1997) [hereinafter SEX OFFENSES AND OFFENDERS]: see also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE. FBI.
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 24 (1999).
22. See SEX OFFENSES AND OFFENDERS. supra note 21.
23. Michael G. Planty & Louise van der Does, Megan's Laws Aren't Enough. WALL ST. J.,
July 17, 1997, at A22.
24. See SEX OFFENSES AND OFFENDERS, supra note 21. at 15: LAWRENCE A. GREENFIELD.
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS. CHILD VICUFIMIZERS: VIOLENT OF-
FENDERS AND THEIR VICTIMS 2 (1996).
25. See SEX OFFENSES AND OFFENDERS, supra note 21. at 15.
26. Id. at 18.
27. See id. at 15. It is clear from the statistics offered by the Department of Justice that sex
offenders repeatedly find themselves within the criminal justice system, given their high rate of
recidivism. Id.
28. Id. This discussion refers to specific deterrence (when a punishment has the effect of
preventing a specific criminal from committing another crime himself) rather than general deter-
rence (when a punishment for one criminal has the effect of preventing others from committing




is to repeat his or her original crime.30 In fact, estimates of recidivism
for untreated sex offenders have been as high as eighty percent. 31 Al-
though eighty percent is on the high end of estimates, the rate consist-
ently reached in studies hovers between fifty and sixty percent. 32
These numbers must also be considered in context: there is only a 3%
chance of being apprehended for child molestation, and each adult
homosexual pedophile has an average of 150 victims.3 3
Before modern sexual predator laws were enacted to civilly commit
such individuals, state correctional facilities released these predators
into society.34 States stood by helplessly, waiting for the predators to
re-offend so the criminal justice system could intervene again. The
previous system was ineffective at handling the unique problem of
sexual predators, and several states searched for an answer.
B. The Most Recent Solution
That answer came in the form of resurrected "sexual psychopath"
laws, now labeled "sexually violent predator" laws. 35 These laws, en-
acted largely in the 1990s, sought to commit sexually dangerous
criminals to mental health facilities for treatment and rehabilitation
30. See SEX OFFENSES AND OFFENDERS, supra note 21. at 27: A.J. BECK ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1983 at 6
(1997) (noting that rapists are ten and one half times more likely than non-rapists to be re-
arrested for a similar crime, while other sex offenders were seven and one half times more likely
than non-sex offenders to be re-arrested). It should be noted, however, that even these shocking
numbers are presumed to be significant underestimates, given the lack of reporting often associ-
ated with sexual crimes.
31. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF CORRECTIONS, A PRACTITIONER'S
GUIDE TO TREATING THE INCARCERATED MALE SEX OFFENDER xiii (1988) (hereinafter PRAC-
TITIONER'S GUIDE). The recidivism rate for treated sex offenders falls dramatically, however, to
approximately fifteen percent. Id.
32. M.E. Rice et al.. Sexual Recidivism Among Child Molesters Released From a Maximum
Security Psychiatric Institution. 59 J. CONSULT. & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 381, 386 (1991): R.A.
Pretky, Sexual Offender Recidivism Revisited: A Meta-analysis of Recent Treatment Studies. 1997
J. CONSULT. & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 635, 659.
33. Gene G. Abel et al., Self-Reported Sex Crimes of Non -incarcerated Paraphiliacs. 2 J. IN-
TERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 3 (1987).
34. See Siegel, supra note 1.
35. Sexual psychopath statutes, which were enacted by thirty states and the District of Colum-
bia by 1958. sought to protect society and rehabilitate sex offenders. See Alan H. Swanson.
Sexual Psychopath Statutes: Summary and Analysis. 51 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY Sci. 215. 215
(1960). The statutes, which viewed sex offenders as neither normal nor legally insane, attempted
to remedy the problem of sexual crimes by committing sex offenders for indeterminate periods
of time, until either treatment was complete, or the patient was safe to be at large. Id. See also J.
Harper Cook. Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders: South Carolina's Sexually Violent Predator
Act, 50 S.C. L. REV. 543 (1999). Courts, though often criticized, never struck down these statutes
on constitutional grounds. See, e.g., Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court. 309 U.S. 270
(1940): People v. Sims. 47 N.E.2d 703 (Il1. 1943): People v. Chapman. 4 N.W.2d 18 (Mich. 1942).
Nonetheless, most were repealed by the 1970s for political reasons.
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and to protect society from the dangers posed by these individuals. 36
The period of confinement under such laws is indefinite, as the pro-
gress of treatment cannot be determined with specificity at the
outset. 37
Washington was the first state to enact a sexually violent predator
law, and many other states soon followed. 38 Kansas's statute, the
Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act (Kansas Act), was closely pat-
terned after Washington's and will be discussed throughout this Com-
ment. Under the Kansas Act, a trial must be held in order to
determine if a person is a sexually violent predator; that is, whether
that person "has been convicted of or charged with a sexually violent
offense and who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality dis-
order which makes the person likely to engage in repeat acts of sexual
violence. '39 Throughout the trial, the person being examined is af-
forded many of the rights associated with a criminal proceeding.40
These rights are in place to ensure the presence of as many safeguards
as possible during a proceeding that has far-reaching consequences. 41
36. KAN. STAT. ANN, § 59-29a01 (Supp. 2002).
37. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368 (1983) (noting "because it is impossible to predict
how long it will take for any given individual to recover-or indeed whether he ever will re-
cover-Congress has chosen .. .to leave the length of commitment indeterminate, subject to
periodic review of the patient's suitability for release). See also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a07.
38. NATIONAL Ass'N OF AF-rORNEYS GENERAL. CRIMINAL LAW, JUVENILE JUSTICE & CRIME
PREVENTION SURVEY, SIXTH ANNUAL NAAG SELF-REPORT FROM -ITHE STATES A-9 (1999) (not-
ing that. as of 1999. at least seventeen states and the District of Columbia had statutes providing
for the civil commitment of sexually violent predators).
39. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02. The definition of sexually violent predator includes people
who have been charged with a sexual offense. Id. However, this only applies if the person has
been determined to be incompetent to stand trial pursuant to Kansas state law. Id. Other per-
sons eligible for commitment proceedings include those found not guilty of a sexually violent
offense by reason of insanity and persons found not guilty of a sexually violent offense, but
where the jury answered in the affirmative the special question asked pursuant to section 22-
3221 of the Kansas Code (asserting special jury question, "Do you find the defendant not guilty
solely because the defendant, at the time of the alleged crime, was suffering from a mental
disease or defect which rendered the defendant incapable of possessing the required criminal
intent?"). Id. § 59-29a03. The Act defines "mental abnormality" as "a congenital or acquired
condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the person to commit
sexually violent offenses in a degree constituting such person a menace to the health and safety
of others." Id. § 59-29a02. "'Likely to engage in repeat acts of sexual violence' means the per-
son's propensity to commit acts of sexual violence is of such a degree as to pose a menace to the
health and safety of others." Id. "'Sexually motivated' means that one of the purposes for
which the defendant committed the crime was for the purpose of the defendant's sexual gratifi-
cation." KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02.
40. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01 - 59-29a20.
41. The controversy surrounding the fact that so many rights are afforded defendants in these
proceedings will be discussed in Part Ill. infra notes 181-251 and accompanying text.
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1. Procedure
When the State wishes to have a person determined a sexually vio-
lent predator, several procedural hurdles must be cleared before com-
mitment can be ordered. 42 A petition must first be filed with the
court.43 A judge then determines whether there is probable cause to
believe that the named person is a sexually violent predator.44  If
probable cause is present, the court will order that the person be
taken into custody. 45 Within seventy-two hours, the person in custody
will be notified of a hearing where he or she may contest the finding
of probable cause.46 If probable cause is confirmed, the person will be
subjected to a professional evaluation prior to trial.4 7 A trial follows,
and if the fact-finder determines the person to be a sexually violent
predator beyond a reasonable doubt, the person will be taken into
custody by the Secretary of Social and Rehabilitative Services for
"control, care and treatment until such time as the person's mental
abnormality or personality disorder has so changed that the person is
safe to be at large." 48
42. Samuel Jan Brakel. J.D. & James L. Cavanaugh Jr., M.D., Of Psychopaths and Pendulums:
Legal and Psychiatric Treatment of Sex Offenders in the United States, 30 N.M. L. REV. 69, 70
(2000).
43. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a04.
44. Id. § 59-29a05. Note that only certain sexual offenses make a person eligible for commit-
ment under the Sexually Violent Predators Act. Id. §59-29a02(e). These crimes are:
(1) rape: (2) indecent liberties with a child: (3) aggravated indecent liberties with a
child: (4) criminal sodomy: (5) aggravated criminal sodomy; (6) indecent solicitation of
a child: (7) aggravated indecent solicitation of a child: (8) sexual exploitation of a child:
(9) aggravated sexual battery: (10) aggravated incest; (11) any conviction for a felony
offense in effect at any time prior to the effective date of this act, that is comparable to
a sexually violent offense as defined in subparagraphs (1) through (11) or any federal
or other state conviction for a felony offense that under the laws of this state would be
a sexually violent offense as defined in this section (12) an attempt. conspiracy or crim-
inal solicitation of a sexually violent offense: or (13) any act which either at the time of
sentencing for the offense or subsequently during civil commitment proceedings pursu-
ant to this act, has been determined beyond a reasonable doubt to have been sexually
motivated.
Id.
45. Id. § 59-29a05.
46. Id. At the probable cause hearing, the detained person has the following rights: (1) to be
represented by counsel: (2) to present evidence on his or her own behalf: (3) to cross-examine
witnesses testifying against him or her: and (4) to view and copy all reports and petitions in the
court file. Id.
47. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a05.
48. Id. § 59-29a06. The defendant shall be examined by a professional of his or her choosing
upon request. At trial, either party may request a jury. If a jury is chosen, the determination as
to the defendant's status as a sexual predator must be unanimous. Id. § 59-29a07. See generally
Brakel & Cavanaugh. supra note 42: Donna Cropp Bechman. Sex Offender Civil Commitments:
Scientists or Psychics?. 16-SUM CRIM. JUST. 24 (2001) (explaining modern methods of determin-
ing likelihood of re-offending).
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2. The Number of Individuals Committed
The Kansas legislature, as well as the legislatures of other states,
proclaimed its resolve to protect society from a small but "extremely
dangerous group of sexually violent predators. '49 The Kansas Act
was written to address a very specific population of predator, and, as
discussed above, several procedural safeguards were put in place to
ensure the law be implemented as intended.50 Preliminary figures in-
dicate that the goal of committing only the "worst of the worst" is
being achieved. 51 In fact, less than two percent of sex offenders incar-
cerated in Kansas have been civilly committed. 52 The numbers vary
among other states with similar laws, but all states have committed
between just one and ten percent of their sex offenders since these
laws were enacted several years ago.53 Although not determinative,
these figures tend to show that the states are respecting the heavy
burden the law requires for the involuntary civil commitment of sex-
ual predators.
C. The United States Supreme Court Upholds Civil
Commitment for Sexual Predators
On numerous occasions, the United States Supreme Court has ad-
dressed civil commitment generally, as well as commitment of sexual
predators specifically, and has consistently held the concept of civil
commitment constitutionally sound. 54 The Supreme Court has identi-
fied two primary purposes or justifications for the involuntary civil
commitment of citizens. 55 First, under parens patriae powers, states
have a legitimate interest in treating mentally deficient citizens.56 Sec-
ond, states have a responsibility to protect society from dangerously ill
individuals pursuant to state police power. 57 Both of these purposes
are implicated within the context of dealing with sexually violent
predators, as all such predators suffer from mental illness or personal-
ity disorders and their violent acts certainly pose a danger to society. 58
49. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01.
50. Id.
51. See Brakel & Cavanaugh, supra note 42, at 81.
52. Id. at 79-81.
53. Id.
54. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979): Allen v. Illinois. 478 U.S. 364 (1986): Kansas
v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997): Seling. 531 U.S. 250.
55. Addington. 441 U.S. at 426: Jones, 463 U.S. at 361.
56. Addington. 441 U.S. at 426.
57. Id.
58. All sexually violent predators suffer from such disorders, as a disorder must be found
before an individual fits the definition of a sexually violent predator under the statute. KAN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01 - 59-29a20.
2003] 1251
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Although the Court recognizes these compelling justifications, the
possible loss of liberty these individuals face requires strict constitu-
tional safeguards to prevent unnecessary commitment. 59 A discussion
of the following Supreme Court decisions outlines the constitutional
requirements the Court has set forth for civil commitment of sex
offenders.
1. Addington v. Texas
Addington was critical in shaping modern requirements for involun-
tary civil commitment. This 1979 decision determined that the "clear
and convincing" standard of proof was appropriate for indefinite com-
mitment proceedings.60 Although not a sexual predator, Addington
was committed several times due to mental illness. 61 He was found to
be mentally ill and a potential danger to himself or others by "clear,
unequivocal, and convincing" evidence. 62 The Court held that a stan-
dard above "preponderance of the evidence" was required for com-
mitment, even though the proceeding was civil in nature, due to the
significant liberty interest at stake.63 The Court noted that "loss of
liberty calls for a showing that the individual suffers from something
more serious than is demonstrated by idiosyncratic behavior," and in-
creasing the standard of proof guards against inappropriate commit-
ments.64 However, the "reasonable doubt" standard invoked in
criminal proceedings was likewise inappropriate, given that commit-
ment was not punitive in nature, but rather focused on providing care
for ill individuals.65 Further, the Court expressed concern that a bur-
den so high might "completely undercut its efforts to further the legiti-
mate interests of both the state and the patient that are served by civil
commitments. '66 In balancing the individual's interest in not being
59. Addington, 441 U.S. at 426.
60. Id. at 418.
61. Id. at 420.
62. Id. at 421.
63. Id. at 427.
64. Id. Note that in Jones v. United States, the Court explained that when a person is proven
to have committed a criminal act due to mental illness, any civil commitment thereafter would
ensure that the individual was not being confined based on "idiosyncratic behavior," as a "crimi-
nal act by definition is not 'within a range of conduct that is generally acceptable.'" Jones, 463
U.S. at 367 (quoting Addington, 441 U.S. at 427).
65. Addington, 441 U.S. at 428-30. "The State of Texas confines only for the purpose of pro-
viding care designed to treat the individual." Id. at 428 n.4.
66. Id. at 429. "Given the lack of certainty and the fallibility of psychiatric diagnosis, there is a
serious question as to whether a state could ever prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an indi-
vidual is both mentally ill and likely to be dangerous." Id. A reasonable doubt standard may
"impose a burden the state cannot meet and thereby erect an unreasonable barrier to needed
medical treatment." Id. at 432.
1252 [Vol. 52:1245
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involuntarily confined for an indefinite period with the state's interest
in providing care for the individual and protecting other citizens, the
Court concluded that an intermediate standard adequately encom-
passed the relevant concerns.67 This opinion is often cited for support
of the position that civil confinement of sexual offenders is not a crim-
inal sanction. 68
2. Allen v. Illinois
In an early case concerning the civil commitment of sex offenders,
the Supreme Court upheld the Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons
Act (Illinois Act) as civil in nature for purposes of the Fifth Amend-
ment's protection against compulsory self-incrimination. 69 Petitioner
Terry B. Allen was charged with committing the crimes of unlawful
restraint and deviate sexual assault. 70 After his indictment, the State
petitioned to have him declared a sexually dangerous person under
the Illinois Act. 71 Both examining psychiatrists testified that Allen
was mentally ill, possessed criminal propensities to commit sexual as-
saults, and demonstrated such propensities through his prior criminal
acts.72 Upon commitment, Allen appealed, claiming he was forced to
answer incriminating questions during his psychiatric evaluations in
violation of his Fifth Amendment rights. 73 The Court held that be-
cause the Illinois Act was civil in nature, as demonstrated by a variety
of criteria, the Fifth Amendment did not apply to the proceeding for
commitment. 74
The legislature explicitly characterized the Illinois Act as civil in na-
ture and, therefore, only upon the "clearest proof that the statutory
scheme is so punitive .. .as to negate the State's intention" that the
proceeding be civil will it be deemed criminal. 75 Given that the stat-
ute obligated the State to provide "care and treatment for persons
67. Id. at 431.
68. See generally Hendricks. 521 U.S. 346.
69. Allen. 478 U.S. at 364.
70. Id. at 365.
71. Id. The Illinois Act defines sexually dangerous persons as: "-All persons suffering from a
mental disorder, which .. .has existed for a period of not less than one year .... coupled with
criminal propensities to the commission of sex offenses, and who have demonstrated propensi-
ties toward acts of sexual assault or acts of sexual molestation of children." Illinois Sexually
Dangerous Persons Act, ILL. COMP. SiAT. ANN.. ch. 205. 205/1.01 (1998).
72. Allen. 478 U.S. at 366.
73. Id. at 367.
74. Id. The Court observed that "the State's interest in treating. and protecting the public
from. sexually dangerous persons would be 'almost totally thwarted' by allowing those persons
to refuse to answer questions posed in psychiatric interviews . Id.
75. Id. at 369.
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adjudged sexually dangerous designed to effect recovery in a facility
set aside to provide psychiatric care" and provided that upon recov-
ery, the patient shall be discharged, Allen failed to prove the Illinois
Act was criminal in nature. 76 The Court also held that, although the
Illinois Act afforded persons many rights available in criminal pro-
ceedings, the provision of these rights did not automatically convert
the statute into one that was punitive in nature. 77
The dissent, written by Justice John Paul Stevens, and joined by Jus-
tices William Brennan, Thurgood Marshall, and Harold Blackmun, ar-
gued simply that the statute was criminal in nature. 7 Justice Stevens
urged that the law required an examination of the entire statute in
context, and that such an examination led to the conclusion that the
statute was so similar to a criminal statute that it should be labeled
criminal as well.7 9
Once the Supreme Court established the civil nature of these stat-
utes, the next step for opponents was to argue that civil commitment
was unconstitutional as a matter of due process, which was the heart
of the argument in Kansas v. Hendricks. 0
3. Kansas v. Hendricks
In 1997, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Kan-
sas Act, which provided for the civil commitment of certain sex of-
fenders upon their release from prison. 81 Leroy Hendricks was the
first inmate committed under the Kansas Act and appealed on
grounds of substantive due process, double jeopardy, and ex post facto
law-making. 82
Hendricks's criminal history of sexually abusing children spanned
three decades, beginning in 1955 when he was found guilty of indecent
exposure.8 3 In 1957, he was convicted of lewdness with a young girl
and went to jail for a brief period.84 In 1960, while working for a
76. Id.
77. Allen, 478 U.S. at 378.
78. Id. at 376.
79. Id.
80. See Hendricks. 521 U.S. 346.
81. Id. The Court quotes a portion of the Act's preamble: "'[Slexually violent predators gen-
erally have anti-social personality features which are unamenable to existing mental illness treat-
ment modalities and those features render them likely to engage in sexually violent behavior.'
Id. at 351 (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (1994)).
82. Id. at 350. See supra notes 35-53 and accompanying text (discussing the Sexually Violent
Predator Act).
83. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 354.
84. Id.
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carnival, he molested two young boys. 5 He was paroled after serving
just two years of that sentence, only to be re-arrested for molesting a
seven-year-old girl.86 After a brief time in treatment for sexual devi-
ance, he was deemed safe and released into society once again. 7 But,
shortly after, he sexually assaulted a young boy and girl.88 For these
crimes he served less than five years and refused to participate in sex
offender treatment while incarcerated. 9 Hendricks was paroled in
1972 and abandoned treatment for pedophilia, the disorder with
which he was diagnosed. 90 Just after his latest parole, Hendricks be-
gan sexually abusing his stepdaughter and stepson, forcing them to
engage in sexual activity with him over a period of four years. 91 Fi-
nally, in 1984, Hendricks was convicted for taking indecent liberties
with two thirteen-year-old boys and served a ten-year sentence in
prison. 92 At the end of the last prison sentence, the State of Kansas
sought to have Hendricks committed under the Kansas Act. 93 At
trial, Hendricks admitted to being unable to control his urges to mo-
lest children and informed the court that the only way he could stop
was "to die."' 94 After the trial, Hendricks was deemed a sexually vio-
lent predator and committed for an indefinite period to a mental
institution.95
Hendricks claimed that the Kansas Act was violative of substantive
due process because it only required a finding of a "mental abnormal-
ity" rather than demanding proof of "mental illness."' 96 In response,
the Supreme Court held that the term "mental abnormality" sufficed





89. Hendricks. 521 U.S. at 355. In fact, Hendricks made a point to tell a physician that "treat-
ment is bull--. Id.




94. Hendricks. 521 U.S. at 354. Hendricks was diagnosed with pedophilia (a diagnosis with
which he "readily agrees"), personality trait disturbance, and passive -aggressive personality. Id.
at 355 n.2.
95. Id. at 356-57.
96. Id.
97. Id. The Court stated:
The liberty secured by the Constitution of the United States to every person within its
jurisdiction does not import an absolute right in each person to be, at all times and in
all circumstances, wholly free from restraint. There are manifold restraints to which
every person is necessarily subject for the common good. On any other basis organized
society could not exist with safety to its members.
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Court noted that it had historically sustained civil commitment stat-
utes when they "have coupled proof of dangerousness with the proof
of some additional factor, such as 'mental illness' or 'mental abnor-
mality."' 98 These additional requirements served to limit the class of
committed persons to a narrow group of dangerous persons.99 Finally,
the Court held:
[t]he Kansas Act is plainly of a kind with these other civil commit-
ment statutes: It requires a finding of dangerousness, and then links
that finding to the existence of a "mental abnormality" or "person-
ality disorder" that makes it difficult, if not impossible., for the per-
son to control his dangerous behavior. 100
In sum, the Court, unanimously and without qualification, held the
Kansas Act comported with substantive due process requirements. 10
Hendricks also claimed that the Kansas Act was criminal in nature
and thus violated the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses of
the United States Constitution.1 0 2 As in Allen, the Court required a
party questioning the nature of an explicitly marked civil statute to
satisfy a heavy burden in order to persuade the Court to treat the
statute as criminal.10 3 Hendricks failed to convince a majority of the
Court of the merits of this argument.10 4 First, the Court held the Kan-
sas Act did not implicate retribution or deterrence, the two primary
goals of criminal punishment. 0 5 No criminal culpability was attached
to the civil commitment, so retribution was necessarily excluded as an
objective.10 6 Further, the Court noted that since those committed per-
sons were suffering from an abnormality or illness, they were pre-
vented from exercising adequate control over themselves and were,
therefore, unlikely to be deterred by the civil commitment statute107
Id. The Court further held that it would not require the legislature to use the same categorical
labels as are accepted by the medical community. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 356-57.
98. Id. at 357.
99. Id. at 357. The Court stated: "States have in certain narrow circumstances provided for
the forcible civil detainment of people who are unable to control their behavior and who therebv
pose a danger to the public health and safety." Id. Note, though. that the Court recalled this
historical civil commitment justification, but did not hold that a person must be unable to control
his behavior before commitment is warranted. Rather, it upheld the Kansas Act as it was, with-
out qualifying the statutory criteria. This point will be further explored in Part V.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Hendricks. 521 U.S. at 350.
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Moreover, those committed were treated in the same manner as other
involuntarily committed persons, not as criminals in prison. 08
The fact that the program may fail to offer adequate treatment to
some patients did not convince the Court that it was a punitive law.109
The Court noted that while some dangerous persons may not be treat-
able, that fact alone did not obligate their release into society.' 10 The
majority further stated that "[u]nder appropriate circumstances and
when accompanied by proper procedures, incapacitation may be a le-
gitimate end of the civil law."''' The fact that Kansas's "overriding
concern," segregation of sexually violent offenders, was consistent
with civil law and bolstered by the State's ancillary goal of providing
treatment to offenders when it was possible."t 2 With all of his argu-
ments defeated, Hendricks's civil commitment was reinstated, and the
United States Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Kansas
Supreme Court." 3
Justice Anthony Kennedy, who noted his full agreement with the
majority, entered a short concurrence."t 4 His agreement was based
largely on the specific facts of this case.' '5 He offered a cautionary
note: "If ... civil confinement were to become a mechanism for retri-
bution or general deterrence, or if it were shown that mental abnor-
mality is too imprecise a category to offer a solid basis for concluding
that civil detention is justified, our precedents would not suffice to
validate it. ' t16
A dissent, written by Justice Stephen Breyer, argued as Justice Ste-
vens did in Allen, that the statute was punitive in nature and should be
recognized as such.' 17 Because of this categorical distinction, Justice
108. Hendricks. 521 U.S. at 367-68.
109. Id. However. now persons committed under the Act receive approximately thirty-two
hours of treatment per week. Id. at 368.
110. Id. at 355-56.
111. Id.
112. 1d.
113. Hendricks. 521 U.S. at 371. Specifically, the Court stated: -We hold that the Kansas
Sexually Violent Predator Act comports with due process requirements and neither runs afoul of
double jeopardy principles nor constitutes an exercise in impermissible ex post facto lawmaking.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Kansas Supreme Court is reversed." Id.
114. Id. at 371 (Kennedy, J.. concurring).
115. Id. (Kennedy. J.. concurring).
116. Id. at 373 (Kennedy. J.. concurring). Justice Kennedy also noted that incapacitation was
a goal common to both the civil and criminal systems of confinement. Id. (Kennedy, J..
concurring).
117. Hendricks. 251 U.S. at 379 (Breyer. J.. dissenting). Specifically. Justice Breyer stated:
[T]he Act before us involves an affirmative restraint historically regarded as punish-
ment: imposed upon behavior already a crime after a finding of scienter: which re-
straint. namely, confinement. serves a traditional aim of punishment, does not primarily
20031 1257
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Breyer insisted the Court should have invalidated the commitment of
Hendricks on ex post facto grounds.' 18 However, the majority of the
Court upheld the statute with no qualifications as constitutionally
sound. 119
A popular argument, the Court again revisited the civil versus puni-
tive issue in 2001 in Seling v. Young, discussed below. However,
before addressing that case, the following section will discuss In re
Crane, a case decided at the state supreme court level before Seling
and then by the United States Supreme Court after Seling.
4. In re Crane
The State of Kansas filed a petition seeking to have Michael T.
Crane adjudicated as a sexually violent predator and committed pur-
suant to the Kansas Act. 120 The State was successful and Crane ap-
pealed from his commitment, arguing that it was unconstitutional
because the State did not prove that he was unable to control his be-
havior.1 21 The Kansas Supreme Court agreed and reversed Crane's
commitment, declaring that the United States Supreme Court read a
volitional impairment requirement into the Kansas Act when it de-
cided Kansas v. Hendricks in 1997.122 The State of Kansas petitioned
the United States Supreme Court for certiorari, which was granted.
The Supreme Court, for the second time in five years, considered the
constitutionality of the same state law it upheld in Kansas v. Hen-
dricks. This section discusses both court decisions regarding Crane.
a. Kansas Changed the Requirements in In re Crane
Crane was convicted of lewd and lascivious behavior for exposing
himself to a tanning salon attendant in 1993.123 Crane also pleaded
guilty to aggravated sexual battery, related to an incident that oc-
curred after Crane left the tanning salon. 124 He entered a video store,
waited until he was alone in the store with the clerk, and then grabbed
her from behind. 125 With himself exposed, he lifted and pushed her
serve an alternative purpose (such as treatment), and is excessive in relation to any
alternative purpose assigned.
Id. at 394 (Breyer, J.. dissenting) (paraphrasing factors from United States v. Ward. 372 U.S. 242.
249 (1980)).
118. Id. at 379 (Breyer, J.. dissenting).
119. Id. at 346.
120. In re Crane, 7 P.3d 285, 285 (Kan. 2000).
121. Id.
122. Id.




2003] PROTECTING LIFE AND LIBERTY 1259
and squeezed her neck while ordering her three times to perform oral
sex and telling her he was going to rape her. 26 Then, suddenly, Crane
stopped and fled the store, ending the attack.'2 7
At the commitment trial, two psychologists and a psychiatrist testi-
fied to the results of their evaluations of Crane. 28 One psychologist,
Douglas Hippe, concluded that Crane suffered from antisocial person-
ality disorder, consistently exhibiting six out of seven criteria listed in
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-
IV).129 Further, Hippe found that Crane suffered from exhibition-
ism.' 30 He expressed the opinion that Crane was a sexual predator
due to both disorders. 131 Hippe also noted that Crane's criminal inci-
dents had increased in frequency and intensity, his actions became
more daring and aggressive, and his disregard for the rights of others
increased as well. 32 Psychologist Robert Huerter testified that there
was no merit to Crane's claim that he had been in a blackout state
during the attack.' 33 Finally, psychiatrist Leonardo Mabugat testified
to Crane's antisocial personality disorder, noting that he displayed "a
pervasive pattern of disregard for and violation of the rights of
126. In re Crane. 7 P.3d at 286.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 287. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders offers the follow-
ing criteria for antisocial personality disorder:
A. There is a pervasive pattern of disregard for and violation of the rights of others
occurring since age 15 years. as indicated by three (or more) of the following: (1) failure
to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behaviors as indicated by repeatedly
performing acts that are grounds for arrest: (2) deceitfulness, as indicated by repeated
lying, use of aliases, or conning others for personal profit or pleasure: (3) impulsivity or
failure to plan ahead: (4) irritability and aggressiveness, as indicated by repeated physi-
cal fights or assaults: (5) reckless disregard for the safety of self or others: (6) consistent
irresponsibility, as indicated by repeated failure to sustain consistent work behavior or
honor financial obligations: (7) lack of remorse, as indicated by being indifferent to or
rationalizing having hurt, mistreated, or stolen from another.
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRic ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC ANi) STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS § 301.7 (1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV]. Items B through D are irrelevant to this
discussion.
130. In re Crane, 7 P.3d at 287. Exhibitionism is defined as '[o]ver a period of at least six
months, recurrent, intense sexually arousing fantasies, sexual urges. or behaviors involving the
exposure of one's genitals to an unsuspecting stranger. The person has acted on these sexual
urges, or the sexual urges or fantasies cause marked distress or interpersonal difficulty." DSM-
IV. supra note 129, § 302.4.




others. '134 Dr. Mabugat also stated that Crane's behavior was a com-
bination of both willful and uncontrollable behavior.135
The lower court held that the State must prove "the existence of a
mental disorder that makes [Crane] likely to reoffend."'1 36 On appeal,
however, the Kansas Supreme Court pointed to several sentences
from the Hendricks opinion, which allegedly supported the inclusion
of a requirement that an individual be completely unable to control
himself. 137 Therefore, the Kansas Supreme Court held that, despite
evidence that Crane suffered from a volitional impairment, his com-
mitment was unconstitutional absent a specific finding that Crane was
unable to control his behavior. 138
b. The United States Supreme Court Vacated the Kansas Decision
In a 7-2 decision announced on January 22, 2002, the United States
Supreme Court vacated the Kansas Supreme Court's reversal of
Crane's commitment under the Kansas Act. 139 The Court held that
Hendricks did not require total or complete lack of control, but that
the Constitution did not permit commitment of the type of dangerous
sexual offender considered in Hendricks without any lack-of-control
determination. 140 The Court instead said "[i]t is enough to say that
there must be proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior.' 141
Recognizing the lack of a bright-line rule in this area of law, the Court
stressed that the "safeguards of human liberty in the area of mental
134. Id. Dr. Mabugat testified that Crane's behavior included the following: failure to con-
form to social norms with respect to lawful behaviors as indicated by repeatedly performing acts
that were grounds for arrest; impulsivity or failure to plan ahead: irritability: and aggressiveness,
as indicated by repeated physical fights or assaults. Id. at 290.
135. Id. at 287.
136. In re Crane, 7 P.3d at 288. Note that this standard corresponds to the Kansas statute.
which provides treatment for "sexually violent predators who have a mental abnormality or
personality disorder and who are likely to engage in repeat acts of sexual violence if not treated"
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a0! (emphasis added).
137. In re Crane. 7 P.3d at 288. Specifically, the Kansas Supreme Court cited the United
States Supreme Court's statement: "'These added statutory requirements serve to limit involun-
tary civil confinement to those who suffer from a volitional impairment rendering them dangerous
beyond their control."' Id. (quoting KAN. STAr. ANN. § 59-29a02(b)) (emphasis in original).
Further, the Kansas Supreme Court noted the statement. "'it requires a finding of future danger-
ousness, and then links that finding to the existence of a mental abnormality or personality
disorder that makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the person to control his dangerous behav-
ior.'" Id.
138. Id. at 290.
139. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 415 (2002).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 413.
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illness and the law" are not always best served by black and white
rules. 142
Kansas raised the question of how imposing such a control require-
ment would impact the part of the statute allowing individuals with
emotional impairments to be committed.1 43 Kansas noted that the
state supreme court's reading of Hendricks would absolutely forbid
the commitment of an individual with a mental abnormality affecting
emotional capacity while volitional capacity remains intact.' 44 The
Court acknowledged that the opinion in Hendricks was limited to a
discussion of volitional impairment, as the facts of that case necessi-
tated. 145 At that point, however, the Court specifically declined to an-
swer the question whether commitment based on emotional
impairment alone would be constitutional. 146 The Court seemed to
believe that this question was not very important, stating "our cases
suggest that civil commitment of dangerous sexual offenders will nor-
mally involve individuals who find it particularly difficult to control
their behavior."'147 However, the Court did note that it usually did not
distinguish between volitional, emotional and cognitive impairments
for constitutional purposes within the context of civil commitment. 148
The dissent, authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, and joined by Jus-
tice Clarence Thomas, argued for a reversal of the Kansas Supreme
Court decision. 149 Justice Scalia noted the Court's departure from its
own precedent in Hendricks by stating:
142. Id. at 414.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Crane. 534 U.S. at 414. The Court explained:
We agree that Hendricks limited its discussion to volitional disabilities. And that fact is
not surprising. The case involved an individual suffering from pedophilia-a mental
abnormality that critically involves what a lay person might describe as a lack of con-
trol. Hendricks himself stated that he could not "control the urge" to molest children.
In addition, our cases suggest that civil commitment of dangerous sexual offenders will
normally involve individuals who find it particularly difficult to control their behav-
ior-in the general sense described above.
Id.
146. Id. at 415.
147. Id. at 414.
148. Id. at 415. The Court stated:
Regardless. Hendricks must be read in context. The Court did not draw a clear distinc-
tion between the purely "emotional" sexually related mental abnormality and the "voli-
tional." Here. as in other areas of psychiatry, there may be "considerable overlap
between a ... defective understanding or appreciation and ... [an] ability to control...
behavior."
Id.




Today the Court holds that the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator
Act (SVPA) cannot, consistent with so-called substantive due pro-
cess, be applied as written. It does so even though, less than five
years ago, we upheld the very same statute against the very same
contention in an appeal by the very same petitioner (the State of
Kansas) from the judgment of the very same court.1 50
Justice Scalia asserted that the requirements of the Kansas Act en-
sured that only individuals with mental abnormalities that impaired
their control would be committed. 151 Thus, the extra requirement ad-
ded by the majority for a finding of inability to control behavior was
unnecessary. 152 Justice Scalia also took issue with the Court's reopen-
ing of a question "closed by Hendricks: whether the [Kansas Act] also
cannot be applied as written because it allows for the commitment of
people who have mental illnesses other than volitional impair-
ments."1 53 He observed that distinguishing between various types of
impairments in the civil commitment setting lacked common sense.1 54
He noted that "[it is obvious that a person may be able to exercise
volition and yet be unfit to turn loose upon society. The man who has
a will of steel, but who delusionally believes that every woman he
meets is inviting crude sexual advances, is surely a dangerous sexual
predator."'155
Moreover, Justice Scalia expressed concern over the vague test for
constitutionality advanced by the majority. 156 He argued that trial
courts would have "not a clue" about how to determine if an individ-
ual possesses the requisite lack of control over himself to qualify for
commitment. 57 Finally, the dissent asserted that the majority opinion
degraded the authority of the Court by revoking a decision made less
than five years earlier. 58 Justice Scalia stated that "[t]here is an obvi-
150. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 419-20 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
152. Id. (Scalia. J.. dissenting). Justice Scalia stated: "[Tlhe SVPA's required finding of a
causal connection between the likelihood of repeat acts of sexual violence and the existence of a
*mental abnormalitv' or 'personality disorder' necessarily establishes 'difficulty if not impossibil-
ity' in controlling behavior." Id. at 419 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
153. Id. at 421 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
154. Crane, 534 U.S. at 422 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
155. Id. (Scalia, J.. dissenting).
156. Id. at 422-23 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 423 (Scalia. J.. dissenting).
158. Id. at 424 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia asserted:
The Kansas Supreme Court still did not like the law and prevented its operation, on
substantive due process grounds. once again. The State of Kansas again sought certio-
rari, asking nothing more than reaffirmation of our 5-year-old opinion-only to be told
that what we said then we now unsay.
Id. (Scalia. J., dissenting).
[Vol. 52:12451262
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ous lesson here for state supreme courts that do not agree with our
jurisprudence: ignoring it is worth a try."'' 5 9
5. Seling v. Young
After the Kansas Supreme Court decided In re Crane, but before
the United States Supreme Court issued an opinion in Crane, Seling v.
Young was decided by the United States Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court upheld Washington State's Community Protec-
tion Act (Washington Act), a civil commitment statute for sexual
predators.160 Andre Brigham Young appealed from a unanimous jury
determination that he was a sexually violent predator, subject to con-
finement under the Washington Act. 16 Young argued that the Wash-
ington Act was unconstitutional because it was punitive in application
to him.t 62
Young was convicted of six rapes over three decades.' 63 It was
upon his latest release from incarceration that the State of Washington
sought to have him committed as a sexually violent predator.
64
An expert testified that Young suffered from a severe personality
disorder with primarily paranoid and antisocial features. 65  Young
was also diagnosed with severe paraphilia, 166 classified as either
159. Crane. 534 U.S. at 424 (Scalia. J.. dissenting).
160. Seling, 531 U.S. at 253.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 253-54.
163. Id. at 255.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 255-56.
166. A paraphilia is a condition whereby a person's ability to become sexually aroused and/or
gratified is dependant upon either fantasizing about or performing certain atypical or extreme
sexual behavior. The Sinclair Intimacy Institute Website. at http://www.intimacyinstitute.com/
sex data/topics/parahilia.html (last visited Feb. 18. 2003) (on file with DePaul Law Review).
Paraphilias are much more prevalent among men than women, and the focus of such paraphilias
is usually constant and specific. Id. Examples of paraphilias include: fetishism (fixation on an
object or body part that is not considered sexual in nature): transvestism (males' need to dress in
women's clothing in order to become aroused): voyeurism (becoming sexually aroused by watch-
ing people undress or engaged in sexual activity, without their knowledge or consent): exhibi-
tionism (compulsively exposing one's genitals to unsuspecting victims in order to shock or
frighten them): sadism (deriving sexual gratification from inflicting pain on one's partner): mas-
ochism (deriving sexual gratification from being subjected to pain): pedophilia (fixation on fan-
tasy or engagement in sexual acts with children): and bestiality (engaging in sexual activity with
animals). Id. See also DSM-IV. supra note 129. at 522. Definition of paraphilia is as follows:
recurrent, intense sexually arousing fantasies, sexual urges. or behaviors generally in-
volving 1) non-human objects. 2) the suffering or humiliation of oneself or one's part-
ner. or 3) children or other non-consenting persons. that occur over a period of at least
6 months. The behavior, sexual urges, or fantasies cause clinically significant distress or
impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning.
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paraphilia sexual sadism 167 or paraphilia not otherwise specified
(rape). 68
The Washington Supreme Court concluded that the Washington
Act was "concerned with treating committed persons for a current
mental abnormality, and protecting society from the sexually violent
acts associated with that abnormality, rather than being concerned
with criminal culpability."1 69 The United States Supreme Court
agreed with this finding and, as it did in Allen and Hendricks, found
the Washington Act civil on its face.1 70 Because the Washington Act
was determined to be facially civil, Young's "as applied" challenge
had to fail.'17  To allow such challenges when the statute was civil,
concluded the Court, would prove "unworkable." 172 "The civil nature
of a confinement scheme cannot be altered based merely on vagaries
in the implementation of the authorizing statute."1 73 The Court re-
served the question of whether specific circumstances might be con-
sidered in the primary inquiry into the nature of such a statute.1 74
Concurring opinions by Justices Scalia and Thomas primarily fo-
cused on answering the question that the majority reserved.' 75 Both
concurrences concluded that there was no difference between a pri-
mary inquiry and subsequent ones for purposes of as applied chal-
lenges to a statute.1 76 Justice Scalia stated, "We repeated, to be sure,
the principle that the statutory scheme would be criminal if it was suf-
167. Where, over a period of at least six months, a person experiences -recurrent, intense
sexually arousing fantasies, sexual urges, or behaviors involving acts (real. not simulated) in
which the psychological or physical suffering (including humiliation) of the victim is sexually
exciting to the person." DSM-IV. supra note 129. § 302.84. The definition also includes the
requirement that the "person has acted on these sexual urges with a non-consenting person. or
the sexual urges or fantasies cause marked distress or interpersonal difficulty." Id. (emphasis
added).
168. Seling. 531 U.S. at 256. "The State's expert concluded that Young's condition, in combi-
nation with the personality disorder, the span of time during which Young committed his crimes.
his recidivism, his persistent denial, and his lack of empathy or remorse, made it more likely than
not that he would commit further sexually violent acts." /d.
169. Id. at 257.
17(0. Id. at 260-61.
171. Id. at 263.
172. Id. In his concurrence, Justice Thomas stated that not only are as-applied challenges
"unworkable," they are prohibited by Hudson v. United States. Seling. 531 U.S. at 272 (Thomas.
J.. concurring) (citing Hudson v. United States. 522 U.S. 93 (1997)).
173. Id. at 263.
174. Id. at 265-66.
175. Id. at 267-74 (Scalia & Thomas, J.J.. concurring).
176. Id. Justice Scalia noted that "harsh executive implementation cannot 'transfor[m] what
was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty,' any more than compassionate
executive implementation can transform a criminal penalty into a civil remedy." Id. at 269
(Scalia. J.. concurring). Justice Scalia further noted the Court's "sound and traditional reluc-
tance to be the initial interpreter of state law." Seling. 531 U.S. at 270 (Scalia. J.. concurring).
1264 [Vol. 52:1.245
PROTECTING LIFE AND LIBERTY
ficiently punitive 'either in purpose or effect,' but it was clear from the
opinion [Hudson v. United States] that this referred to effects apparent
upon the face of the statute."'177
The sole dissenter, Justice Stevens, urged that Young should have
been allowed to prove that the statute was criminal in nature as ap-
plied to him and thus agreed with the Ninth Circuit's holding.1 78 De-
spite this dissent, Young's constitutional challenge to the law failed,
and his commitment under the Washington Act was reinstated.1 79 The
Ninth Circuit's judgment was reversed.1 80
III. ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL TREATMENT
AND POPULAR ARGUMENTS
The analysis in this section focuses primarily on four cases: Kansas
v. Hendricks, In re Crane, as decided by the Kansas Supreme Court,
Seling v. Young, and Kansas v. Crane, the most recent United States
Supreme Court decision on the subject of civil commitment for sexual
predators. This Comment asserts that Hendricks was properly de-
cided, In re Crane was improperly decided in light of Hendricks and
Young, and the United States Supreme Court failed to follow its own
precedent when deciding Kansas v. Crane. This section also explores
common arguments against civil commitment for sexual predators and
why they fail to be persuasive.
A. Kansas v. Hendricks was Properly Decided
In Hendricks, the Supreme Court faced several constitutional argu-
ments, and properly rejected each of them. This section discusses why
the Court was correct in its ruling on substantive due process and ex-
plains why it was logical, rather than determinative, that the Court
addressed Hendricks in terms of volitional control specifically. Fi-
nally, this section addresses the public policy interests upheld by the
Court's decision.
177. Id. at 269 (Scalia. J., concurring) (citing Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93.99 (1997)
(quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242. 248-49 (1980)) (emphasis in original)).
178. Id. at 275 (Stevens. J., dissenting).
179. Id. at 267.
180. Id. It is worth noting that nowhere in the Court's opinion do the phrases "volitional
impairment" or -unable to control" appear. despite the fact that the Court reproduced the part
of the Washington statute that defined those persons eligible for commitment.
2003] 1265
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1. Civil Commitment Statutes for Sexual Predators Do Not Violate
Due Process
The Supreme Court held in Hendricks that the Kansas Act did not
violate substantive due process. 81 "Substantive" due process is the
constitutional requirement that legislation must be fair and reasonable
in content and that it must further a legitimate government interest. 18 2
Here, according to the Court, Kansas's use of the term "mental abnor-
mality" easily satisfied substantive due process as fair and reasonable
in content.18 3 The use of this term allows the legislature and the medi-
cal community necessary flexibility in identifying and treating sex of-
fenders with a myriad of mental problems, many of them not readily
diagnosable as illnesses or diseases. Such mental problems, although
not fitting neatly into ready-made medical pigeonholes, cause the pa-
tient to experience severe social and personal distress,8 4 as evidenced
by repeated criminal behavior. This distress may manifest in several
ways, including, as the Kansas Act recognizes, emotional impairment
of the individual. 185
Critics argue that these sex offenders should not be committed be-
cause they could not be committed under general civil commitment
laws and, thus, the new laws are violative of substantive due pro-
cess. 186 This argument fails to acknowledge that states have authority
to devise more than one commitment law to treat more than one cate-
gory of ill individual. 8 7 In fact, it was necessary for states to design
these sexual predator laws to handle a growing problem in society that
was not adequately addressed by then-existing legislation.' 88  Under
current sexual predator laws, persons with mental abnormalities pose
the requisite danger to society and possess a need for treatment such
181. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 346.
182. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 517 (7th ed. 1999).
183. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 346. The Court stated that "Hendricks' diagnosis as a pedophile.
which qualifies as a 'mental abnormality' under the Act. thus plainly suffices for due process
purposes." Id. at 360 (emphasis added).
184. See supra note 166 (defining paraphilia, per DSM-IV).
185. The definition of "mental abnormality" in the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act
reads: "congenital or acquired condition affecting emotional or volitional capacity which predis-
poses the person to commit sexually violent offenses." KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(b).
186. This was argued by the defendant in Kansas v. Hendricks. who claimed civil commitment
required a specific finding of mental illness, ignoring the distinction between general civil com-
mitment laws and sexual predator commitment laws. Hendricks. 521 U.S. at 361-62.
187. Id. at 359. "[Wle have never required state legislatures to adopt any particular nomen-
clature in drafting civil commitment statutes. Rather, we have traditionally left to legislators the
task of defining terms of a medical nature that have legal significance." Id.
188. Legislation prior to the sexual predator commitment laws consisted only of general com-
mitment laws. which required a finding of mental illness as a predicate for confinement and
treatment. See KAN. SrAi. ANN. § 59-29a01.
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that commitment would be proper. The Court in Hendricks properly
dismissed the argument the petitioner tried to assert.' 89 No due pro-
cess consideration was offended by the addition of another, more spe-
cialized, commitment statute.' 90
Having established the governmental interests of protecting its citi-
zens and treating the ill, the Kansas Act was deemed fair and reasona-
ble in content, and thus not violative of substantive due process. 191
This decision by the Supreme Court was a necessary step in allowing
states to protect their citizens from new dangers, namely sexually vio-
lent predators.
2. The Court's Opinion in Kansas v. Hendricks was Necessarily
Replete with References to Volitional Control
The specific facts of Hendricks lent themselves to the Court's repet-
itive language concerning volitional control. Several statements
throughout the opinion made reference to Hendricks's admitted lack
of control over his behavior. 92 This is to be expected where a defen-
dant testified before the court that he would not stop molesting chil-
dren until he dies.' 93 Such clear and unequivocal admission of lack of
control makes a commitment decision easier than when a defendant
professes, even if falsely, remorse and a promise never to do it again.
Here, Hendricks gave the district court a clear reason to commit him,
as he even agreed with the diagnosing physician that he was a
189. The Court stated that "mental abnormality" is equally sufficient, for substantive due pro-
cess purposes, as "mental illness.- See supra notes 80-119 and accompanying text (discussing
Hendricks).
190. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 357.
191. Id. at 350.
192. Such statements by Justice Thomas included: "States have in certain narrow circum-
stances provided for the forcible civil detainment of people who are unable to control their
behavior and who thereby pose a danger to the public health and safety." Id. at 357. "These
added statutory requirements serve to limit involuntary civil confinement to those who suffer
from a volitional impairment rendering them dangerous beyond their control." Id. at 358.
The Kansas act is plainly of a kind with these other civil commitment statutes: It re-
quires a finding of future dangerousness, and then links that finding to the existence of
a "mental abnormality" or "personality disorder" that makes it difficult, if not impossi-
ble, for the person to control his dangerous behavior.
Id. "[lIt narrows the class of persons eligible for confinement to those who are unable to control
their dangerousness." Id. "This admitted lack of volitional control, coupled with a prediction of
future dangerousness, adequately distinguishes Hendricks from other dangerous persons who
are perhaps more properly dealt with exclusively through criminal proceedings." Hendricks, 521
U.S. at 360. "Those persons committed under the Act are. by definition, suffering from a
,mental abnormality' or a 'personality disorder' that prevents them from exercising adequate
control over their behavior." Id. at 362.
193. Id. at 355. "He stated that the only sure way he could keep from sexually abusing chil-
dren in the future was 'to die." Id.
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pedophile.1 94 Such facts contributed largely to the Supreme Court's
language, but despite all the references to volitional control, the hold-
ing of the case merely upheld the Kansas Act and noted that the crite-
ria contained therein would make it clear that a defendant would have
difficulty controlling his behavior. 195 That is, in order to satisfy the
remainder of the statute, some impairment had to be present, though
the Court did not specify that the impairment must be volitional.
Under the statute, and therefore presumably under the Court's hold-
ing, an emotional impairment would suffice. The Court's volitional
language should not be read to require the presence of volitional im-
pairment as a predicate, as the Court should have been explicit in the
holding if it intended such a rquirement be added.
3. The Supreme Court Reaffirmed Sound Policy by Upholding the
Kansas Act
The Hendricks decision was based on sound policy considerations
that have been long recognized by the Supreme Court. Civil commit-
ment has historically been approved as proper for a specific group of
persons in order to protect society from them, and them from them-
selves. 196 The Court affords the Kansas legislature and other state
legislatures the latitude they need when dealing with modern
problems. This latitude is granted in spite of, in fact, because of, disa-
greement within the medical community.1 97 When society wants to
enact a law, but medicine and science do not offer certainty as to the
course, the legislature is granted broad power.1 98 This is a necessary
policy of the Court, given the lack of uniformity in the area of
psychology.
Moreover, the Court gave the protection of society due weight in
this decision. Often, the rights of the offender take precedence over
194. Id. "Hendricks readily agreed with the state physician's diagnosis that he suffers from
pedophilia and that he is not cured of the condition." Id.
195. Specifically. the Court stated: "We hold that the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act
comports with due process requirements and neither runs afoul of double jeopardy principles
nor constitutes an exercise in impermissible ex post facto lawmaking." Hendricks, 521 U.S. at
371. During oral arguments in Kansas v. Crane, the Court noted that it also held the following:
"The Kansas Act is plainly of a kind with these other civil commitment statutes: It requires a
finding of future dangerousness, and then links that finding to the existence of a 'mental abnor-
mality' or 'personality disorder' that makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the person to control
his dangerous behavior." Id. at 358.
196. See id. at 357; Addington, 441 U.S. at 426-27: Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71. 80 (1992).
197. See Jones, 463 U.S. at 365.
198. "[R]egarding congressional enactments, when a legislature 'undertakes to act in areas
fraught with medical and scientific uncertainties, legislative options must be especially broad and
courts should be cautious not to rewrite legislation."' Hendricks. 521 U.S. at 360 n.3 (citing
Jones, 463 U.S. at 370) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
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the rights of society, and this opinion offered a proper balance. The
State has a heavy burden to prove-beyond a reasonable doubt in the
minds of twelve jurors or a judge-that a sex offender is in fact a
sexual predator in need of treatment and confinement. 199 Once this is
proven, however, society is protected from mentally deficient offend-
ers until such time as the person is no longer a danger to others.200
This is especially important for protecting children, which has histori-
cally been deemed a compelling interest by the Supreme Court. 20'
Finally, the Court allowed states to compel an ill person to undergo
treatment where it was necessary. 20 2 Although not always successful,
studies have shown drastically decreased recidivism rates for sex of-
fenders who have received treatment. 20 3 However, when sex offend-
ers are offered treatment during incarceration, it is very often refused
for a number of reasons.2114 The Kansas Act provides for treatment
that may benefit the individual, when he otherwise would not accept
it. This protects society as well as the treated individual, as repeated
incarceration, not surprisingly, has been shown to have negative ef-
fects on inmates. 20 5
B. In re Crane was Wrongly Decided by the Kansas Supreme Court
and Only Partially Redeemed by the United States
Supreme Court
The Kansas Supreme Court improperly read a requirement of com-
plete lack of control into the Hendricks decision. Although the
United States Supreme Court, in Kansas v. Crane, acknowledged this
error, it added a lack of control requirement that was seemingly ab-
sent in Hendricks and never even mentioned in Seling v. Young.
While the general statute was upheld, the Court amended its earlier
decision in a break from precedent. This section discusses why the
199. See lendricks. 521 U.S. at 357-59.
200. See KAN. STAI. ANN. § 59-29a07.
201. See Isaac. supra note 15. at 1314-15. Isaac discusses the Supreme Court's opinion in New
York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982), where the Court stated:
A democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded growth
of young people into full maturity as citizens. Accordingly, we have sustained legisla-
tion aimed at protecting the physical and emotional well-being of youth even when the
laws have operated in the sensitive area of constitutionally protected rights.
Id. at 757 (internal citations omitted).
202. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a07.
203. See PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE. supra note 31: John W. Parry, Shrinking Civil Rights of Al-
leged Sexual Predators. 25 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 318. 320 (2001).
204. See Daley. supra note 14. at 720 (noting that sex offenders often refuse treatment in
prison because they do not want other inmates to know about their crimes, as rapists and child
molesters are hated by other inmates).
205. See generally Dorsett. supra note 14.
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Kansas Supreme Court's analysis was flawed and why the United
States Supreme Court, albeit to a lesser degree, was also incorrect in
its analysis of prior case law.
1. The Supreme Court Did Not Explicitly Add a Volitional
Impairment Requirement to the Kansas Act in Its Holding
in Kansas v. Hendricks
The explicit holding of Kansas v. Hendricks was "that the Kansas
Sexually Violent Predator Act comports with due process require-
ments and neither runs afoul of double jeopardy principles nor consti-
tutes an exercise in impermissible ex post facto lawmaking. "206
Nowhere in that holding did the Court add another constitutional re-
quirement to the Kansas Act. When the Supreme Court heard oral
arguments on this case on October 30, 2001, Justice Scalia stated the
holding as including the following statement:
The Kansas Act is plainly of a kind with these other civil commit-
ment statutes: It requires a finding of future dangerousness, and
then links that finding to the existence of a "mental abnormality" or
"personality disorder" that makes it difficult, if not impossible, for
the person to control his dangerous behavior. 20 7
Even given this version of the holding, there is no language to support
a separate requirement of volitional control specifically. In fact, Jus-
tice Scalia, in his dissent in Kansas v. Crane, explained that the above
holding recognized that some lack of control was inherently present in
individuals who qualified under the Kansas Act.208 Thus, no separate
finding should have been required. The fact that the Kansas Supreme
Court required one demonstrates a lack of understanding of Hen-
dricks and an improper reading of the Kansas Act. The United States
Supreme Court now requires a separate finding of some lack of con-
trol, which is confusing given its own precedent in Hendricks and
Young.
2. Kansas v. Crane Conflicts with Seling v.Young
The decision in Young, coming down after In re Crane and before
the Supreme Court heard arguments on Kansas v. Crane, offers clari-
fication for many of the arguments the Kansas court endorsed in In re
Crane. The Kansas court focused primarily on the Supreme Court's
206. Hendricks 521 U.S. at 371.
207. See Oral Argument of Carla J. Stovall on Behalf of Petitioner, Kansas v. Crane. 2001 WL
t398618, at *28 (statement by Justice Scalia) (hereinafter Oral Argument).
208. See supra notes 150-159 and accompanying text.
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references to volitional control when it decided Hendricks.20 9 Nota-
bly, the Young decision made absolutely no reference to volitional
control, or lack thereof, as being a requirement for a statute to be
constitutional on its face.210 In fact, Justice O'Connor, writing for the
majority, recited the definition of a sexual predator under the Wash-
ington Act, and the jury's findings at Young's trial. 21 Both statements
are completely void of any language regarding volitional control. Yet
never does the majority, the concurrences, or the dissenting opinion
even mention the "added requirement" that was supposedly asserted
in Hendricks. One would think that if the Supreme Court had altered
the Kansas Act to require an additional finding, it would certainly
have altered the Washington Act similarly, as the two are practically
identical in wording. It reasonably follows that failure to indicate the
additional requirement means there is no such additional constitu-
tional requirement at all. Although the Washington Act came before
the Court under a presumption that it was facially civil, 21 2 surely the
Court would have pointed out that the omission of the new require-
ment makes the statute patently unconstitutional on its face if that
were the case. The Court even compared the Washington Act with
the Kansas Act explored in Hendricks, calling the two "strikingly simi-
lar."'213 Nor was the point of volitional control moot, because the
lower court did not make a specific finding that Young was unable to
control his behavior.214
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Kansas v. Crane is
puzzling given this recent case. Fortunately, however, the Supreme
Court did not endorse the Kansas court's complete lack of control
standard. Rather, the majority agreed with Kansas that such a stan-
209. See generallv In re Crane. 7 P.3d 285.
210. See Seling. 531 U.S. 250.
211. Id. at 254.
The Act defines a sexually violent predator as someone who has been convicted of, or
charged with, a crime of sexual violence and who suffers from a mental abnormality or
personality disorder that makes the person more likely to engage in predatory acts of
sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility.
Id.
In the state expert's opinion, severe paraphilia constituted a mental abnormality under
the Act. The State's expert concluded that Young's condition, in combination with the
personality disorder, the span of time during which Young committed his crimes, his
recidivism, his persistent denial, and his lack of empathy and remorse, made it more
likely than not that he would commit further sexually violent acts.
Id. at 256.
212. Id. at 260-61. "As the Washington Supreme Court held and the Ninth Circuit acknowl-
edged. we proceed on the understanding that the Washington Act is civil in nature." Id.




dard was unworkable and unnecessary. This new standard, however,
may present application problems. Just how little control must a per-
son have over himself before he may be committed under the Kansas
Act?
3. How Much and What Type of an Impairment Should Be
Required? The United States Supreme Court Gives No
Clear Answer
The United States Supreme Court seems to have made any type of
impairment of ability to control behavior and decisions-not merely
physical inability to control-grounds for commitment. This is the
most logical and workable standard, because differentiating between
types of impairment could create problems in the application of the
statute. Because such a standard has been adopted, there really is no
need for an additional factual finding of such impairment, as impair-
ment of some type is required by the DSM-IV in order to diagnose a
disorder or abnormality in the first place. 21 5 Therefore, the Supreme
Court's requirement of a separate finding seems redundant, but is
hopefully harmless from a practical standpoint.
The potentially larger problems arise when courts must decide just
how much control over oneself is enough to escape commitment. Not
only is the type of impairment needed unclear, but the extent of the
impairment is also vague. Justice Scalia, in his dissent, highlighted the
subjectivity of the majority's chosen standard. 216  He questioned
whether a percentage value, frequency ratio, or merely an adverb
should be attached when charging a jury with what they must find in
order to commit. 217
215. See Oral Argument, supra note 207, at *6-31. Ms. Stovall made several references to this
requirement being "part and parcel" to a psychiatric diagnosis and, therefore, there was no need
for a separate finding of something inherent in an initial diagnosis. Id.
216. Crane. 534 U.S. at 422-24.
217. Id. "How is one to frame for a jury the degree of 'inability to control' which, in the
particular case, 'the nature of the psychiatric diagnosis, and the severity of the mental abnormal-
ity' require?" Id. (emphasis in original).
Will it be a percentage ("Ladies and gentleman of the jury, you may commit Mr. Crane
under the SVPA only if you find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he is 42% unable to
control his penchant for sexual violence")? Or a frequency ratio ("Ladies and gentle-
men of the jury, you may commit Mr. Crane under the SVPA only if you find, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that he is unable to control his penchant for sexual violence 3 times
out of 10")? Or merely an adverb ("Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you may commit
Mr. Crane under the SVPA only if you find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he is
appreciably-or moderately, or substantially, or almost totally-unable to control his
penchant for sexual violence")? None of these seems to me satisfactory.
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It should be recognized that a disorder that impairs the ability to
make a decision, because it severely distorts the person's view of the
situation, is just as dangerous as a disorder that compels a person's
behavior. Although the Supreme Court declined to rule on whether
an emotional impairment would suffice under constitutional stan-
dards, presumably it would if the state could show it affected behavior
and/or decision-making abilities to the extent required. After all, the
Court noted in its opinion that it has historically declined to distin-
guish between certain types of impairments and, as Justice Scalia
noted, doing so would not make sense.
In sum, the Kansas legislature included both emotional and voli-
tional impairments in order to cover the range of disordered individu-
als who are both dangerous to society and sexually violent. The
Kansas Supreme Court did not have the authority to overrule the
United States Supreme Court's earlier unqualified endorsement of the
Kansas legislature's enactment of the Kansas Act. It may not couch
its disfavor of commitment legislation for sexual offenders in constitu-
tional language and expect that language to legitimize its own per-
sonal objections to a law properly enacted by the state government.
On the other hand, the United States Supreme Court does have the
authority to overrule its earlier unqualified endorsement of the Kan-
sas Act, and it seems to have done so here.
Having explored the judicial opinions on the subject, the following
section of this Comment will address several arguments often em-
braced by scholars in opposition to civil commitment of sexual
predators.
C. Common Arguments Opposing Civil Commitment of
Sexual Predators
Scholars and commentators have advanced several arguments as to
why civil commitment of sexual predators is unconstitutional. The
most common arguments include the following: (1) the "slippery
slope" argument; (2) these laws are examples of "reactionary legisla-
tion;" (3) the statutes are truly punitive in nature because treatment is
delayed until the end of a prisoner's incarceration; (4) civil commit-
ment of sexual predators equals a life sentence for them; and (5) civil
commitment statutes do not address the majority of offenders, who
are never apprehended and convicted. This section discusses these ar-
guments and why they fail to be persuasive.
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1. The "Slippery Slope" Argument is Inadequate to Challenge
Sexual Predator Commitment Laws
An argument often advanced by critics of sexual predator commit-
ment laws is the familiar "slippery slope:" 218 If we allow commitment
of sexual predators, what will follow, commitment of robbers and
drunk drivers? 219 All criminals have relatively high recidivism rates,
and many have antisocial personality traits, so the argument goes.
However, this argument is flawed in four significant ways.
First, sexual predators as a class are distinguishable from general
criminals. Their recidivism rates are dramatically higher than are
those of other types of crimes. 220 They are driven to criminality by
serious mental conditions, often stemming from their own childhood
abuse. They are not motivated by monetary need, as are many who
rob. Even the Federal Rules of Evidence recognize sexual offenses as
different from other violent crimes.221  As one commentator ex-
plained, "[w]here rape is involved, the rules of the game are simply
different. ' 222 Specifically, Rules 413-415 allow for admission of evi-
dence in sex offense cases, both criminal and civil, that would other-
wise not be admissible. 223 The rules themselves, and the congressional
discussion of them, clearly indicate the legislature's recognition of sex
crimes as a category in need of and deserving special
considerations .224
218. See Daley, supra note 14, at 731-32: Dorsett. supra note 14, at 144 (suggesting that drug
addicts who commit robberies to obtain money or alcoholics may be committed under the Kan-
sas statute).
219. See Dorsett, supra note 14.
220. Barbara K. Schwartz & Henry R. Celini, Sex Offender Recidivism and Risk Factors in the
Involuntary Commitment Process, in THE SEX OFFENDER: THEORETICAL ADVANCES TREATING
SPECIAL POPULATIONS AND LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS 8-16 (Barbara K. Schwartz ed.. 1997).
221. See FED. R. EVID. 412-415. For agreement with this argument, as well as further elabora-
tion, see Isaac, supra note 15, at 1314-15.
222. Vivian Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77
COLUM. L. REV. 1. 10 (1977).
223. Federal Rule of Evidence 413 provides, in part: "In a criminal case in which the defen-
dant is accused of an offense of sexual assault, evidence of the defendant's commission of an-
other offense or offenses of sexual assault is admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on
any matter to which it is relevant." FED. R. EVID. 413. Federal Rule of Evidence 414 provides,
in part: "In a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of an offense of child molestation.
evidence of the defendant's commission of another offense or offenses of child molestation is
admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant." FED. R.
EVID. 414. Federal Rule of Evidence 415 provides for admission of evidence of prior acts in civil
trials. FED. R. EVID. 415.
224. 140 CoNG. REC. H8991-H8992 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (statement of Rep. Molinari):
The enactment of this reform is first and foremost a triumph for the public-for the
women who will not be raped and the children who will not be molested because we
have strengthened the legal system's tools for bringing the perpetrators of these atro-
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Moreover, the harm inflicted by these offenders is primarily aimed
at children, who are in special need of protection.225 Aside from mur-
der, sexual abuse is possibly the most traumatic and horrible crime a
victim could endure, with effects that last a lifetime. The harm is so
great in these crimes, especially when the victim is a child, that these
laws are necessary to protect the public from a different kind of crimi-
nal and a different kind of harm.
Second, although the concern over defining the proper candidates
for involuntary commitment is extremely valid, there are statutory
and procedural safeguards in place. For example, although many in-
mates may have antisocial personality traits, far fewer have antisocial
personality disorders provable beyond a reasonable doubt.226 Some
studies estimate seventy-five percent of incarcerated individuals ex-
hibit antisocial personality traits.227 However, of these that are violent
sex offenders in the first place, the mere exhibition of antisocial per-
sonality traits is not enough to warrant commitment under such a stat-
ute. 228 There must be a finding of antisocial (or other) personality
disorder, not merely traits, and this disorder must be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.229 Further, all jurors must be unanimous in their
decision.230 Then, the State has the burden of proving that this disor-
der is what causes the person to be likely to repeat his violent sexual
crimes. 23' This must also be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.232
All of these safeguards ensure that the government cannot become
overzealous and seek to commit all sex offenders indefinitely.
Third, the evidence simply does not support a finding that prosecu-
tors are abusing their discretion to continue to "punish" all sex offend-
cious crimes to justice. The proposed reform is critical to the protection of the public
from rapists and child molesters, and is justified by the distinctive characteristics of the
cases it will affect. In child molestation cases, for example, a history of similar acts
tends to be exceptionally probative because it shows an unusual disposition of the de-
fendant-a sexual or sadosexual interest in children that simply does not exist in ordi-
nary people.
Id.
225. The Supreme Court has upheld the protection of children as compelling, even when con-
stitutional rights are at stake. See Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (upholding a conviction, despite a First
Amendment challenge, under a law that banned the knowing promotion of a sexual perform-
ance by a child under age sixteen).
226. See Oral Argument, supra note 207, at *9-14.
227. See id. at *15.
228. See KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01 - 59-29a20.
229. Id. These diagnoses are based on the opinions of medical professionals, experts in their
field. Further, the statutes provide for a defendant to have his own expert evaluation by a pro-






ers, much less going after other categories of criminals. 233 In Kansas,
under two percent of sex offenders incarcerated for sexually violent
crimes satisfying the statute have been committed pursuant to this
law.234 In fact, of the few who have been committed, six are now in
the process of release from the program. 235 None of the six, though
not completely discharged yet, has repeated their crimes. 236 The sta-
tistics in other states are similar to Kansas. 237 Prosecutors are only
using this law in its intended capacity: to protect citizens from a "small
but extremely dangerous group" of criminals.
Finally, the argument ignores the power of the courts to prevent the
legislature from extending beyond constitutional bounds. The slip-
pery slope argument cannot prevail as a reason to repeal these laws
because it improperly dismisses the power of the courts. If the legisla-
ture began passing laws allowing for the civil commitment of burglars,
for example, there is no question the courts would fulfill their duty
and put a stop to the unconstitutional lawmaking.238 There is no need
to prematurely assume the worst of the legislature and government
when no evidence exists to support such a belief. The Supreme Court
has often acknowledged its power to stop abuse of discretion if and
when it arises. 239 There is no occasion to doubt that power now.
2. The Validity of Legislation is Not Diminished
Because the Public Requested It
It is true, as many scholars assert, that this legislation was prompted
largely by societal pressure.240 However, societal need is a perfectly
legitimate reason to enact new legislation. After all, this pressure
came from parents of young children who ride their bikes around their
neighborhoods, much like Earl Shriner's seven-year-old victim did
before he was savagely attacked and left to die. It came from sisters
233. See Brakel & Cavanaugh, supra note 42, at 79-81.
234. Id.
235. See Oral Argument. supra note 207, at *20.
236. Id.
237. See Brakel & Cavanaugh, supra note 42, at 79-81.
238. The Court in Hendricks noted that most criminals, non-sex offenders, are better dealt
with by the criminal justice system. See Hendricks. 521 U.S. at 360.
239. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986) (declining to
place an absolute prohibition on particular types of jurisdiction to avoid where -some hypotheti-
cal 'slippery slope' may deposit us"). see also Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978) (exercising
the Court's authority to limit the number of jurors required to no fewer than six, despite an
earlier ruling leaving the question open).
240. See generally Sarah E. Spierling, Lock Them Up and Throw Away the Key: How Washing-
ton's Violent Sexual Predator Law Will Shape the Future Balance Between Punishment and Pre-
vention. 9 J.L. & PoL'Y 879 (2001); Dorsett. supra note 14: Brake] & Cavanaugh. supra note 42:
King, supra note 14: Daley. supra note 14.
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and brothers of those women who had been brutally raped by men
like David Burdette. 24t It came from outraged and frightened citizens
who were being forced to share their neighborhoods with sexually vio-
lent child molesters like Kevin Haenchen, 242 who should have been in
a mental hospital rather than a suburban townhouse.
This pressure on legislatures to enact laws that would protect inno-
cent victims, women and children who fell prey to these sex offenders,
was not the result of a conspiracy to permanently imprison all the men
in the country who had an occasional impure thought. 243 It was the
desire of a democracy to require a law to protect itself from the most
dangerous and mentally ill recidivist criminals out there. Legislatures
should be commended for responding, rather than condemned for do-
ing so. It is their responsibility to act in the people's best interests,
and often the people know what is in their best interests and are capa-
ble of communicating it to their government. Chief Justice William
Rehnquist has written:
[A] presumption of constitutionality [for Congressional enactments]
makes eminent good sense. If the Supreme Court wrongly decides
that a law enacted by Congress is constitutional, it has made a mis-
take, but the result of its mistake is only to leave the nation with a
law duly enacted by the popularly chosen member of the House of
Representatives and the Senate and signed into law by the popu-
larly chosen President. But if the Court wrongly decides that a law
enacted by Congress is not constitutional, it has made a mistake of
considerably greater consequence; it has struck down a law duly en-
acted by the popularly elected branches of government, not because
of any principle in the Constitution but because of the individual
views of desirable policy held by a majority of the nine justices at
that time. Every time an individual or a group asserts a claim of
constitutional right against a legislative act, the principle of majority
rule and self-government is placed on one side of the judicial scale,
and the principle of the individual right is placed on the other side
of the scale. The function of the Supreme Court is, indeed, to hold
241. David Burdette was already a serial rapist in 1982. when he then began raping women he
saw in a magazine article describing them as Omaha's ten most "eligible women." He served
less than six vears for those rapes, was released, and begin raping recently widowed women he
discovered through the obituary columns in local newspapers. One woman was a young widow
with two daughters, ages seven and eight. Burdette tied one child to each of the woman's arms
and forced them to watch their mother's rape. See Don Sternberg. Whv Nebraska Needs Civil
Conuiitnent Proceedings for Sex Offenders. 33 CREIGHTON L. REV. 721. 721 (200f0).
242. Kevin Haenchen sexually assaulted twenty-seven children before being arrested in 1987.
See Daley,. supra note 14. He received only a ten-year sentence. Id. at 715. Before being re-
leased from prison. Haenchen promised to continue molesting children and decided to torture
and kill them as part of a new fantasy he had developed. Id. He stated. "I know what will
happen when I see a child. There's nothing a parent can do." Id.
243. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01. The statute specifically targets "a small but extremely
dangerous group."
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the balance true between these weights in the scale, and not to con-
sciously elevate one at the expense of the other.244
3. A Delay in Treatment Does Not Render the Statute Criminal in
Nature
A particularly compelling argument that the commitment laws for
sex offenders are truly punitive lies in the fact that treatment is often
delayed until such time that the offender is going to be released from
prison.245 This situation may appear to prove that the commitment
law is truly criminal in nature, and not civil, as it has been deemed.
Although in the author's opinion, treatment should begin earlier, ab-
sence of such a provision does not render the law punitive.
First, the criminal laws do provide for incarceration when a person
commits a violent sexual crime. 246 There is no reason to revoke the
state's right to punish merely because a provision to treat later is
available. Criminal law is used as a method to achieve goals of deter-
rence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and retribution. 247 In fact, treat-
ment for sex offenders is universally available for prisoners while
incarcerated, but many refuse to accept it, as Hendricks refused dur-
ing his prison career. 248 Civil commitment laws are used to incapaci-
tate and rehabilitate.2 49 They do not serve all of the purposes of
244. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 279 (2001). The analogy between state
government enactments and federal governmental enactments can be easily drawn, especially
given the Court's historic respect of and deference to a state's interpretation of its own laws.
Seling, 531 U.S. at 270 (Scalia, J., concurring); see R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S.
496, 500-01 (1941).
245. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 385 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
246. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-13 (2002) (defining and describing Criminal Sexual
Assault and providing sentencing requirements for repeat offenders); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-
14 (defining Aggravated Criminal Sexual Assault); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-14.1 (defining
Predatory Criminal Sexual Assault of a Child); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-15 (defining Criminal
Sexual Abuse): 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-16 (defining Aggravated Criminal Sexual Assault).
247. See SANDY KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER. CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 97-
167 (6th ed. 1995).
248. Leroy Hendricks refused treatment several times during his ten-year sentence in Kansas.
See JOHN DOUGLAS & MARK OLSHAKER, OBSESSION 346 (Lisa Drew ed., 1998). Treatment in
prison is usually offered on a voluntary basis, and is often unsuccessful. "One reason for this is
that, even among the numerous murderers and other felons, sexual offenders, especially child
molesters, are despised by other inmates." See Daley, supra note 14, at 719-20. Because of this
hatred, sex offenders will often not accept treatment, for fear that other inmates will learn of
their crimes. Id.
249. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 363-66. The Court recognized that confinement of danger-
ously mentally ill persons for the protection of society "is a legitimate non-punitive governmen-
tal objective and has been historically so regarded." Id. at 363. Further, the Court noted that
"incapacitation may be a legitimate end of the civil law." Id. at 366. See also KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 59-29a01 - 59-29a20 (establishing civil commitment procedure for "the long-term care and
treatment of the sexually violent predator").
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criminal laws and thus should not be substituted for them. Further,
civil commitment procedures allow for the Department of Corrections
to perform its duties before the more expensive treatment provided
by the statutes is imposed. It is the hope that civil commitment will
not be necessary after incarceration, as is true in over ninety-eight
percent of the Kansas cases involving sex offenders. 250 Civil commit-
ment is the last resort, the final hope for treating the severely ill, to be
utilized only after efforts during incarceration have failed.
4. Civil Commitment of a Sexual Predator is Not Necessarily a Life
Sentence
The Kansas Act's indefinite period of confinement is seen as a life
sentence for many offenders. This may be true, but commitment will
not result in lifetime confinement for those who accept and participate
in their own treatment and who actively engage in their own recovery.
Those offenders will be reintegrated into society as healthier citizens.
Offenders who refuse to participate in the therapy will not rejoin soci-
ety as soon, but is this undesirable from society's standpoint? Of
course it is undesirable from the offenders' standpoint, but so is incar-
ceration in the first place. The criminal justice system does not release
criminals into society simply because they do not enjoy prison. Why
should the mental health system release dangerous, untreated individ-
uals into society just because they want to go? Violent sexual
predators who deny they have a problem and refuse to take responsi-
bility for their actions or participate in treatment have no place near
our children. These are not the rehabilitated citizens ready to re-enter
society, they are instead sick individuals in need of help, even if they
cannot admit it.
The only criminals "harmed" by the civil commitment system are
those completely untreatable predators who were fortunate enough to
obtain a plea bargain for less than life imprisonment because, but for
the statute, they would escape without treatment. Offenders who re-
ceived life sentences, treatable or not, will not encounter the program,
so it is irrelevant to them. Treatable offenders will receive help and be
reintegrated into society. If mandatory life sentences were handed
out for all those offenders described by the predator statute, many
treatable offenders would never regain their liberty.
250. See Brakel & Cavanaugh. supra note 42, at 79-81.
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5. The Fact That These Statutes Do Not Prevent All Sexual
Offenders from Victimizing Does Not Diminish Their Value
Civil commitment statutes keep some dangerous predators away
from children. However, it has been argued that the "real" sex
criminals are still at large, as many sex offenders are relatives of their
victims and are never apprehended, and these statutes are ineffective
at handling the problem. 251 While many sex offenders are never
caught, these statutes address a very dangerous group of criminals and
are essential to preventing further crimes from being committed by
the ones that are caught. Simply because these statutes do not address
every type of sex offender does not diminish their appropriateness or
justify their repeal. In fact, if they help reduce violent sex crimes at
all, they should be applauded, not attacked.
Despite the many arguments in opposition of civil commitment for
sexual predators, the courts, including the Supreme Court, continue to
uphold its constitutionality. However, the Kansas Supreme Court's
decision could have had disastrous consequences had it been upheld.
The following section addresses that issue as well as the impact the
current requirements may have on the system.
IV. IMPACT OF KANSAS V. CRANE
The impact of the Kansas Supreme Court's decision would have
been frightening. The impossible standard would have completely un-
dermined the Kansas Act, making it unenforceable. Fortunately, the
United States Supreme Court prevented that result, but the impact of
its decision is uncertain. If other courts interpret the decision as per-
mission to require almost total lack of control, the result may be simi-
lar. On the other hand, as this Comment argues and Justice Scalia has
asserted, the additional finding of a lack of control is unnecessary be-
cause it was already incorporated into the Kansas Act's requirements.
Based on this, the practical impact may be minimal, because if the
State can prove a mental abnormality in the first place, some degree
of inability to control will accompany the diagnosis and should be
251. See King. supra note 14. at 1429.
The incarceration of a handful of individuals is insufficient to address the widespread
problem of sexual abuse. Legislators may propose and enact sexually violent predator
statutes and claim to solve the problem, yet the implementation of such laws protects
but a small minority of victims. By assuming that incarceration is the appropriate rem-
edy. lawmakers and the Supreme Court. which endorsed the legislation, ignore the
need to delve deeper into the -silent epidemic" of the sexual abuse problem in the
United States and to think creatively about methods of prevention.
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readily apparent to the fact finder. Thus, the burden of an additional
finding may be small.
There will be courts, though, like the Kansas Supreme Court, that
disfavor this type of legislation and will interpret the holding to mean
an almost total lack of control must be proved. The potential impact
in those jurisdictions is explored below. The effects discussed could
also result if courts disallow emotional or cognitive impairments to
function as a basis for commitment.
A. Danger to Society
If courts endorse an unreasonably high standard of proof, as the
Supreme Court's decision may allow them to do, many sex offenders
will be free to commit violent sex crimes upon new victims. Although
only between one and ten percent of sex offenders are subsequently
committed under sexual predator statutes, 252 that one or two or ten
percent could be released into America's neighborhoods rather than
being detained in a treatment facility. A man like Earl Shriner, for
example, could move in next door to a family with a seven-year-old
boy, unhindered to continue his criminal plan.253 Children and
women across the nation would again be subjected to convicted and
violent sexual predators who served time in prison and were likely to
have rejected therapy while incarcerated.2 5 4 These laws exist to pro-
tect society from the worst type of violent criminal, and their purpose
is circumvented by insistence on an improvable standard.
B. Economic Impact
Although the physical and psychological harm done to victims of
sex offenders is of course the foremost concern, impact on the econ-
omy is always a consideration when evaluating government legisla-
252. See Brackel & Cavanaugh. supra note 42, at 81.
253. For a discussion of Earl Shriner's crimes, see supra INTrRODUCI ION.
254. It has been repeatedly noted that prisoners have a right to refuse treatment in prison, and
sex offenders very often do refuse such treatment. Leroy Hendricks was one such prisoner who
refused treatment for pedophilia while incarcerated. See tHendricks, 521 U.S. at 354-55; see also
Robert M. Wettstein, Predators and Politics: A Psychiatric Perspective on Washington's Sexuallv
Violent Predators Statute. 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 597. 614 (1992) (discussing how the -vio-
lent, threatening atmosphere of a correctional facility socializes an offender into never showing
weakness or vulnerabilitv and dissuades him from discussing his crimes, especially those involv-
ing the rape and murders of children"). This atmosphere apparently discourages many inmates
from obtaining treatment while in prison. However. should society have to accept an untreated
criminal because he refused treatment based on a fear of inmate aggression at the disclosure of
his crimes'? If an offender is not even willing to undergo treatment to ensure he does not re-
offend when released, he is clearly not ready for release in the first place.
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tion. Both the cost to victims for treatment and the government for
providing therapy to the offenders must be considered.
Victims of the most violent and traumatic crimes may need inpa-
tient psychiatric care for a period following the attack. The cost of
this treatment begins at approximately $1000 per day and increases
with the need for prescription drugs or other physical care.255 Victims
without the money or need for inpatient care may opt for outpatient
care; specifically, hour-long sessions with a psychiatrist or psychologist
on a regular basis. Although it is impossible to determine the costs for
the "average victim," costs for this type of treatment can range from
$2000 per year for monthly sessions in a midwestern suburban clinic,
to $9000 per year for weekly sessions in the same clinic.2 5 6 These esti-
mates vary by geographical location and do not include any prescrip-
tion medications that may be needed. It is important to keep in mind
that the average salary for an American is less than $30,000.257 Many
victims of sex crimes cannot afford this expensive treatment, and turn
to support groups or clergy members for counseling. These estimates
provide a rough picture of the financial cost of therapy for victims, but
cannot begin to encompass the other costs to a victim, including the
possible loss of employment, deterioration of romantic relationships,
and constant fear of another attack. These life-altering costs cannot
be quantified.
The cost of treating sex offenders, which can be quantified, is also
quite high. In 1998 and 1999, California spent just over $31 million on
the sex offender program, about 2% of its mental health services
budget.2 5 8 The cost per inmate treated was about $107,000.259 As
more offenders are committed, obviously the total program cost will
increase. Proportionately, however, only 2% of the California budget
goes toward treating predators and, thus, possibly preventing future
horrible crimes. Society's safety from predators is surely worth such a
small fraction of the government's resources. Further, it is estimated
that pedophiles have an average of 150 victims each, 260 making the
255. Estimate obtained from St. James Hospital, Olympia Fields, Illinois.
256. Estimate obtained from Suburban Heights Medical Center, Psychiatry Department, Chi-
cago Heights, Illinois. Specifically, for a victim of a sex trauma, a psychiatrist will meet with the
patient for an initial consultation, at a cost of $237.00. The following week, the patient will
attend another session, at a cost of $171.00. All subsequent visits will be billed at $171.00.
257. See Salary Too Small? Try Moving to Connecticut. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 7,
2001, available at http://www.usnews.com (last visited Feb. 18, 2003) (reporting that average
American salary in 2000 was $29,676).
258. See Brackel & Cavanaugh, supra note 42. at 89.
259. Id.
260. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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cost of treating the victims of just one pedophile between $300,000
and $1.35 million annually.261
If, however, courts are concerned about high treatment costs for
offenders, awareness of these amounts may encourage imposing
longer prison sentences for those offenders the courts deem "untreat-
able." In fact, in the wake of the widespread enactment of sexual
predator laws, many states have increased prison sentences for repeat
sex offenders. 262 More repeat sex offenders are now serving longer
sentences, and some states have passed mandatory life sentences for
certain sex offenders. 263 Longer prison sentences clearly cut costs for
treatment programs, as incarceration (including voluntary therapy) is
about one-fifth the cost of formal sex offender treatment. 264 If a cer-
tain offender is truly thought to be untreatable, then a life sentence
may be the only way to protect society. However, many sex offenders
are treatable, and should be given the opportunity to rehabilitate and
make a positive contribution to society. The sexual predator laws al-
low for both scenarios, as offenders are released when and if they are
deemed fit to rejoin society. 265
V. CONCLUSION
The advantages of allowing civil commitment for sexually violent
predators pursuant to the Kansas Act are compelling and warrant the
government's exercise in restraining offenders' liberty. Criminals who
commit violent sexual crimes are among the most dangerous type of
criminal. These offenders differ from other criminals in many ways,
necessitating that they be considered in a category of their own for
purposes of confinement, punishment, and treatment.
The civil commitment of sexual predators protects society from
these dangerous individuals. Commitment also provides violent sex
offenders with desperately needed treatment. Studies show that al-
though treatment will not obviate the problem of recidivism entirely,
261. See supra note 256 and accompanying text (approximating costs for treatment of
victims).
262. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-19-203 (1996).
263. LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SEX OFFENSES AN1) OFFENDERS. AN
ANALYSIS OF DATA ON RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT (1997). See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1170.12 (1998): 1996 WASH. LAWS ch. 288 (amending WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.030 and
§ 9.94A.120(4) to authorize a mandatory life sentence for a second time serious sex offender).
The Washington law is also known as the "two strikes and vou're out law." Rachel Zimmerman.
Two-Strikes Sex Crime Law Getting Second fest: Lake Forest Park Man is Charged. SEAFLE
POST-INTELLIGENCER. July 10, 1997, at BI.
264. See Brackel & Cavanaugh. supra note 42. at 88.
265. See supra notes 41-53 and accompanying text.
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it does help.2 66 In fact, it may reduce recidivism by as much as thirty
percent. 267 States that have enacted sexual predator commitment laws
have worked diligently to design programs that benefit the patient.
The laws work toward achieving the goals they were designed to
achieve-sexually violent offenders are kept away from society so
they cannot harm more victims and treatment is provided to reduce or
eliminate their recidivism upon release. 268 These laws are constitu-
tional, as evidenced by prior Supreme Court decisions, and necessary,
as evidenced by tragedies such as one that occurred after Earl Shriner
was released from prison.
The Supreme Court has consistently upheld civil commitment stat-
utes for sexually violent offenders, and fortunately, is not discontinu-
ing the practice now. However, the Kansas Act should have been
enforced as written, without the modification required by the United
States Supreme Court. Given the Selig decision, as well as the Hen-
dricks decision, the Supreme Court had ample precedent to reverse
the Kansas Supreme Court's misinterpretation of Hendricks and en-
force the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act as it was written.
Jennifer Ann Smulin*
266. See Robert Prentky & Ann W. Burgess, Rehabilitation of Child Molesters: A Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 60 AM. J. OF ORTHOPSYCHIATRY, 108, 10817 (1992): William L. Marshall & William
D. Pithers, A Reconsideration of Treatment Outcome with Sex Offenders. 21 CRIM. JUST. &
BEHAV. 10, 10-27 (1994): G.C.N. Hall, Sexual Offender Recidivism Revisited: A Meta-Analysis of
Recent Treatment Studies, 63 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 802, 802-09 (1995).
267. Id.
268. See supra notes 40-64 and accompanying text. For discussion of treatment methods used
in several states with sexual predator laws, see John Kip Cornwell et al., The New Jersey Sexually
Violent Predator Act: Analysis and Recommendations for the Treatment of Sexual Offenders in
New Jersey, 24 SETON HALL LEGiS. J. 1 (1999). The article describes the phase method em-
ployed by many states that is based on a cognitive-behavioral/relapse prevention model. Id. at
16. "Increasing victim empathy, developing relapse prevention skills, acquiring interpersonal
skills, managing negative emotions, and decreasing deviant sexual arousal are common elements
of almost all programs reviewed." Id. at 19.
* Thank you to my grandparents and parents, and to Emily and Brian-for always believing
in me. And special thanks to my mom. whose unconditional love and support have made me
who I am.
[Vol. 52:12451284
